This dearth of attention 16 is even more paradoxical given that the Spanish Civil War marked the death knell of the system of international relations born with the Peace of Versailles. Despite the time that has elapsed since Franco's last war dispatch, the numerous international legal facets of this "European civil war in miniature" 17 may still provide insights for the international legal analysis of modern civil wars. While brief scattered references to the multiplicity of issues raised by the Spanish Civil War can be found in most disparate areas of international law, scholarship still tends to neglect the fact that that it "abounded in anomalous situations". 18 The fundamental international legal event which sealed the dismal fate of the Second Spanish Republic and led to a variety of "anomalous" international legal situations took place at the very outset of the Spanish Civil War. Aware of the logistical support Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy had provided the anti-Republican forces with, in the summer of 1936 the British and French governments decided to champion a collective international non-intervention agreement. The key questions that arise from the Spanish Civil War concern the legality of such an international non-intervention agreement and its accompanying arms embargo. 19 The state of customary international law and treaty law regarding the duties of third states on the occurrence of civil wars justified the expectation of the Spanish government that it could maintain its commercial relations unchanged. The international doctrine of recognition of belligerency was also affected by the establishment of the anomalous pact of "de facto" collective neutrality that cunningly neutralized the League´s system of collective security. Nevertheless, the non-intervention agreement, which aimed to localise the Spanish Civil War, triggered other related international legal problems that caused much ink to flow. These included the uncertain international legal effects of de iure and/or de facto recognition by third states of the insurgent government -a question which had repercussions for matters of jurisdictional immunity arising before the courts of third states. Meanwhile, Britain had domestic legal deterrents designed to prevent national volunteers from enlisting in foreign civil conflicts -an issue that still evokes contemporary controversies between neutral official policies and acts of transnational solidarity in foreign civil strife. 20 The Spanish Civil War is the 20th century event which is most often cited as having singlehandedly prompted more historical research. However, the study of the particular contribution of interwar British international lawyers to the Spanish Civil War remains a neglected area of study for historians and international lawyers alike. 21 This is perplexing, given that the exact concordance of the Realpolitik concerns of the British Foreign Office 19 See e.g. Normal P. Padeldorf, "The International Non-Intervention Agreement and the Spanish Civil War" American Journal of International Law 31 (1937) 578-603 20 . The object of this study is to throw further light on the role interwar British international lawyers played in the debates surrounding to the Spanish civil War. Beyond the scope of this work are left a number of other aspects of possible historical international legal interest emerged from the Spanish Civil War which are common to other civil wars. For an analysis of a number of other issues including e.g. the study of the means of diplomatic dispute settlement that were attempted in order to end the conflict; the international legal regime that was applied to asylum seekers and refugees or concern; the principles and rules of international humanitarian law by then in vigour were applied or what peace-keeping role specialized organisms such as the international Red Cross played in the conflict: or, after the war, what legal regime was applied to the government in exile, what treatment did the United Nations retrospectively apply to the Spanish Civil War or to what developments of the international legal order -such as, for instance, reparations for crimes against humanity or responsibility for historical violations of human rights by foreign intervening powers -may the Spanish civil war be seen to have contributed se e.g. in Spanish, but only very recently, Carlos Fernandez Liesa, La Guerra civil española y el orden jurídico internacional, Thompson Reuters Aranzadi, Madrid, (2014) 21 New research in the history of international law may, indeed, benefit from taking S. Neff's remark seriously: "The role of international lawyers in the various wars of history is another of the many subjects that still awaits a detailed treatment". See Stephen Neff, Justice Among Nations. A History of International Law, Harvard University Press, (2014) 339. and the strategic goals of the Franco nationalist camp still puzzles historians. 22 Much has slipped unnoticed by international law historians as a result of a "tendency to view the official British response to the contending sides in the civil war as almost exclusively determined by a semi-disinterested diplomatic balancing act designed to protect the fragile peace". 23 However, it is historically untenable to identify the single dominant factor behind the British-led policy of localization of the Spanish Civil War as being the preservation of European peace against the danger of escalation of the Spanish Civil War into a full-scale European war. Instead, contemporary historians tend to agree with S. P.
Mackenzie that "the long-suspected true nature of Britain's non-intervention policy has been confirmed in the detailed studies that have emerged since the relevant government files were first opened in the 1970s". 24 Many international lawyers, in their turn, have not hesitated to describe this early milestone in the British policy of appeasement against the irredentism of fascist powers as one that "insofar as traditional international law is concerned was a bastard thing with Alice in Wonderland overtones". 25 The first section of this study examines the establishment of the international non- D. McNair (1946 McNair ( -1955 and H. Lauterpacht (1955 Lauterpacht ( -1960 to these debates. Their writings can be seen as respectively representative of the two stages through which British international lawyers went in the international legal debates on the Spanish Civil War. Up 22 See e.g. Tom Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, (1997) . 23 Helen Graham, "Spain and Europe: the View from the Periphery" The Historical Journal, (1992) 969-983, 971. According to this social historian, this traditional tendency was a consequence of the legacy of "Western cold war ideology" which had "the capacity to impair historical understanding because it presents social realities as if they were static phenomena -to be read backwards in the light of the political status quo". Ibid The Franco-British exchange of notes made "both countries' declarations contingent upon the adherence of the other government plus the governments of Germany, Italy, the Soviet Union and Portugal". 33 Twenty-seven other governments soon jumped on the Anglo-French bandwagon and made similar declarations to those contained in the agreement's preamble, whereby the original parties declared their resolution to "abstain rigorously from all interference" (de toute ingérence, direct or indirect) in the internal affairs of Spain. 34 The parties also subscribed to the agreement's "three declarations of policy", aiming at the immediate implementation of a collective embargo on the sale of weapons to Spain, which extended to contracts that were already in course of execution with the Republican government. Despite the vaunted use of the term "international agreement", J. Edwards has recalled that "no agreement was legally binding on all" 35 the state parties. Indeed, several state parties did not sign the preamble of the nonintervention agreement and some of them appended interpretations, qualifications, or reservations to its provisions. In view of this, already back in 1937 N.P. Padelford remarked that the non-intervention agreement was "merely a concert of policy" whose Brigades. 52 The relative ineffectiveness of the Act, which became saddled with problems of legal applicability and enforcement, was related to the anomalous character of the international regime of non-intervention. From a legal perspective, the wording of the 1870 Act required that "(a) Britain be at peace with both sides, and (b) that each contender be a de facto foreign state -defined as 'any foreign country, colony, province, or part of any province or people, or any person or persons exercising or assuming to exercise the powers of government in or over any foreign country, colony, or province or part of any province or people". 53 Thus, discussions arose as to whether the application of the 1870 Act was tantamount to a British formal recognition of Franco's regime.
Another related question which also created uncertainty within the British Foreign office was whether the "Act was applicable without a formal declaration of neutrality to 48 However, this late realignment could not prevent the Second Spanish Republic from being the "first European victim" of the turn to neutrality. 76 This drift toward neutrality provides the context for the quick subscription by many European powers to the "international non-intervention agreement" in the Spanish Civil War under the leadership of Britain and France. Authors like N. Berman have attempted to discover the intellectual sources of this drive towards neutrality by identifying a series of "theoretical precursors of the justifiers of the "non-intervention" system" in the writings of interwar international lawyers. The existence of these precursors suggests to Berman that the non-intervention "system cannot be simply dismissed as part of the general political collapse of the Versailles system." 77 Rather, he argues, despite "the utter hypocrisy and cynicism with which it (the non-intervention system) was implemented at the time," 78 it emerged "in the context of a series of reform proposals" 79 of the system of collective security. It is true that debates over the need to reform the League in the light of the eruption of conflicts and the ineffectiveness of sanctions were held in 1936 within the framework of the League itself. 80 However, the quick acceptance of the non-intervention agreement outside the framework of the League of Nations suggests looking elsewhere.
A British geo-strategic concern over the existing balance in the Mediterranean was behind the non-intervention policy and the gradual crumbling of the League´s system of collective security. The anti-Republican uprising took place barely a month after Britain had decided to unilaterally urge the abandonment of sanctions against Italy over Abyssinia. 81 [What] we have been witnessing in Spain for the last two years is in a broad way a reversal of the earlier revolt of liberalism against monarchical legitimacy. For this time it is the conservative groups that are the rebels; it is the army and the propertied interests that are questioning the authority of the de iure government; and in their challenge to the constitutional regime they are receiving the support of the clerics, who have normally been on the side of the established order. 85 Fenwick was also aware that answers to foreign intervention in domestic conflicts had ebbed and flowed since the principle of legitimacy had supported foreign intervention on behalf of absolute monarchs against liberal revolts 86 in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Empire. He hinted at a sort of international federal solution against the background of the "failure of international law to develop any general rule expressing the right of the community of nations to intervene between the parties to a civil war" 87 and the consequent "assertion on the part of individual states of a right to take the law into their 83 The partition of Morocco took place. after the Second Moroccan Crisis, or the Agadir Crisis of 1911 spurred again by imperial competition by Germany which bargained its earlier position as defender of the sovereignty of the 86 In Spain itself, for instance, the intervention of the so-called "one hundred thousand sons of Saint Louis", accorded in the Congress of Verona in 1922, put an end to the "liberal triennium" of 1820-1823 during which the official study of "natural law and the law of nations" had been briefly restored in Spain. See further, Ignacio de la Rasilla del Moral, "El estudio de la historia del Derecho internacional en el corto siglo XIX español", 23 Zeitschrift des Max-Planck-Instituts für europäische Rechtsgeschichte (2013) pp.48-65 87 Id. p.539 own hands" 88 throughout the long nineteenth century. Fenwick was aware that although "the method by which the United States has met the problem within the scope of its federal constitution" 89 was suggestive in domestic terms, it was not "sufficiently parallel to the international problem to permit inferences to be drawn from it." 90 Although the letter of the non-intervention agreement cannot in itself be seen as an indication of the emergence of a perception according to which intervention on the side of the legitimate government 91 was permissible in civil wars, it may, however, perhaps, be seen as an occasion that triggered intellectual reflections in this respect. 92 88 Id. p.539 89 p.541. This In accordance with Section 4 of Article IV of the Constitution, the United States (using the plural) "shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence." 90 Id. p.541 91 See e.g., Joseph Barthelemy, La solidarité de gouvernments legitimes, 20 Revue Droit International (RDI) 13-28 (1937) . 92 The main object of this study is to throw further light on the role interwar British international lawyers played in the debates surrounding the Spanish Civil War (See supra note 20). While it should be stressed that the Republican government did not formally request military intervention by a foreign power in Spain, it might be tempting to try to retrospectively -that is, after the horrors of the Second World War -identify the abject failure of non-intervention in the Spanish civil war as the starting point for a change of perspective regarding the legality of intervention upon invitation of a lawful government. However, the letter of the non-intervention agreement in the Spanish Civil War seems a wrong starting point. Although N.P. Padelford already remarked back in 1937 that the non-intervention agreement was "merely a concert of policy" whose "fulfilment depended entirely upon the initiative of each state" (See Padeldorf, op.cit. at 580), this generic statement cannot be read as one putting into question the binding character of the full terms of a non-intervention agreement (pacta sunt servanda) for the states that signed it. It would be wrong to take this remark as something that could run against the fact that, albeit to different degrees, all the states that signed the non-intervention agreement should have felt bound by the terms to which they subscribed. It would therefore be contradictory to interpret that because the non-intervention agreement contained declarations and reservations -that is, because the non-intervention agreement was not legally binding in absolute terms for every signing state in all its composite elements -this meant the starting point of a shift of perception in the sense referred to above. This perspective appears corroborated by G. 
Resolution of the Institut de droit International on 'Duties of Foreign Powers toward the

Government which is fighting the Insurrection' had already made it plain in 1900 that
'every third Power, at peace with an independent nation, is bound" (…) "not to furnish to the insurgents either arms, munitions, military goods, or financial aid" and "not to interfere with the measures which this nation takes for the re-establishing of internal peace". 106 The fact that the US State Department could not enforce its policy of "moral embargo" towards the Republican government against private parties in 1936 further illustrates the fact that the Republican government's consuetudinary expectations were anomalously quashed in the summer of 1936.
Another group of authors, which included the cream of British international lawyers, attempted, by contrast, to carve out the view that the non-intervention system was in accordance with traditional rules or, as Charles Rousseau noted, that "it is neither legal nor illegal, since it develops in a zone of competence which remains, in many respects, a 106 Institut de droit International Duties of Foreign Powers towards the Government which is fighting the Insurrection. Article 2. -Section 1. Every third Power, at peace with an independent nation, is bound not to interfere with the measures which this nation takes for the re-establishing of internal peace. Section 2. It is bound not to furnish to the insurgents either arms, munitions, military goods, or financial aid. Section 3. It is especially forbidden for any third Power to allow a hostile military expedition against an established and recognized government to be organized within its domain. sort of legal no man's land." 107 For British international lawyers, in particular, the nonintervention in Spain was but a collective application of a rigorous version of the traditional doctrine of neutrality. Indeed, this was the departure point of H.A. Smith's contribution to the British Yearbook of International Law in 1937. 108 Smith, who was a professor of International law at the London School of Economics, assimilated the nonintervention agreement to a "collective declaration of neutrality, although presented in an unusual form". 109 However, Smith took issue, as will be examined, with the technical deviations from the resulting international legal scheme that the subsequent British policy of non-recognition of belligerent rights to the parties brought with it. This technical deviation alone impelled him to cast a shadow over the justificatory enterprise: "my hope is that future lawyers will be able to regard the policy pursued in this war as an anomaly.
My fear is that future politicians will regard it as a precedent". 110 H.A. Smith also farsightedly invoked the figure of the "historian of the future", noting that he "will be better able than we are to appreciate the value of the causes which have led to a departure from these rules (the accepted rules which govern the attitude of foreign powers in the Ibid., continued to escalate throughout the war. If there was a line to be drawn between the right of some states to promote a collective arms embargo outside the framework of the League of Nations against the Spanish Republic in defiance of the obligation that "every third power, at peace with an independent nation" had to not interfere "with the measures which this nation takes for the re-establishing of internal peace", 114 Indeed, as Berman notes, the first difficulty for McNair had to do with the "misuse" of the term "neutrality", or at the very least the anomalous enlargement to which it had to be subjected at the time for it to be able to indicate that the non-intervention system could (then) be seen as the application of a stringent version of the duties of neutrals." 123 situation". 128 The private exporter instead, insisted "upon his legal right" to have such licences granted because, as the telegram from the US government readily admitted, the US Neutrality Law "providing for an embargo against the shipment of arms, ammunition and implements of war to "belligerent countries" does not apply to the present civil strife in Spain as it is applicable to wars between nations". 129 Many authors engaged with a second, related, difficulty of the justificatory scheme. This resulted from the fact that the non-intervention agreement implicitly recognized the existence of a war between the parties, and it therefore implicitly entailed the recognition of belligerent rights to the rebels. 130 was no more than an internal disorder, then the agreement was a grave act of intervention in the internal affairs of Spain, for it was an attempt to prevent the Spanish Government from obtaining the supplies which it needed for the restoration of order in its own dominions". 134 128 Ibid. 129 On January 8, 1937, after a by the US President to Congress of "an addition to the existing Neutrality Act to cover specific points raised by the unfortunate civil strife in Spain' the Congress approved the Pittman Resolution. For an immediate criticism that the Pittman Spanish Civil War Resolution reversed the legal order "by placing unrecognized rebels and the constituent government in Spain on the same footing" see E. Borchard "Neutrality" and Civil Wars, the American Journal of International Law 31 (1937) 304-306. 130 And that, it should be highlighted, barely a month after Franco's "glorious national uprising" against the Spanish Republic.. 131 Ballideri served as President of the ECtHR between 1974 and 1980 132 G. Balladore Pallieri « Quelques aspects juridiques de la non-intervention en Espagne » Revue de droit international et de legislation comparee 18 (1937) Remarkably enough in this context, however, the British Foreign Office, which had orchestrated the non-intervention agreement, decided to have it both ways by resisting the recognition of belligerent rights to the contending parties. 135 is any well-settled practice which fetters the discretion of the United Kingdom in deciding whether or not it is politic to grant or to deny recognition of belligerency". 148 Instead, he insisted on the stated practice according to which "our Ministers have frequently repeated that we have granted belligerent rights to neither side" 149 and decided to focus on how the non-recognition of belligerence specifically affected the UK "with special reference to a maritime power like ourselves". 150 McNair again showed again his ability to excel in the lawyer-like practice of argumentative reversion by highlighting the nonapplicability of the rules of belligerence, and in particular those which may affect a maritime power like the UK, such as those that confer "upon both belligerent parties the right of visit and search of the merchant ships of the recognizing State, the right of 146 Ibid. 147 McNair, at 500. "I do not wish to be thought to be lacking in courtesy because I have not dealt with the literature now growing up round the subject of this article, notably Professor Smith's article in the British Year Book of International Law of this year and articles and comments in the American Journal of International Law. I have only refrained because I wanted to state my own view upon the materials available to me, and my article is already long enough. 148 Ibid., at 484. 149 Ibid. 150 Ibid., at 476. McNair's contribution to study of the law relating to the civil war in Spain concludes with him characterizing the legal regime adopted by the UK as one in which "we were compelled by the exigencies of the situation to recognize the fact of insurgency in Spain and thus to embark upon the comparatively uncharted sea of a relationship to both parties of which the rules are ill-defined and still in course of development." 152 A number of states followed the UK into the "unchartered sea" and "adopted the intermediate legal and later that of Italy), H. Lauterpacht critically examined whether "the nature and degree of recognition stated in the (earlier) answer of the foreign office irresistibly led to the conclusion arrived at by the British courts". 172 Lauterpacht opposed this conclusion of the House of Lords on the basis of the need to differentiate between the right of a state to "recognize the insurgents as a government exercising de facto authority over the territory under its control", which, being the British position, was, in Lauterpacht's view, "not contrary to international law", and the fact, as he stressed, that "such recognition is limited in its effects and cannot properly be assimilated to recognition de iure". 173 For Lauterpacht, the distinction derived from what he considered "the established principle that so long as the civil war lasts the recognition of the insurgents, whether recognized as belligerents or not, as a de iure government is contrary to international law". 174 Until that moment arrived, Lauterpacht was of the view contra the interpretation adopted by the British courts (on the basis of their interpretation of the answer they received from the British Foreign Office) that recognition of the insurgent government "while obliging courts to acknowledge the validity of the legislation of the de facto insurgent authority within its territory, it does not transform the authority thus recognized into an independent government of a foreign sovereign state outside its territory to jurisdictional immunities, in particular as against the government recognized de iure, in respect of its property or its representatives". 175 The neglect of the study of the Spanish Civil War among historians of international law may account for the lack of attention by the 170 Law added itself to the pre-war batch of new international law journals which "had broken the pattern (if it was such)" 184 of earlier nineteenth century journals on international law of "not pointing to any national and regional allegiance" in their title. 185 However, the academic appeal of international law in England in the early interwar period should be seen in relative terms: as of 1921, there were only 10 public teachers of international law in the United Kingdom. 186 Admittedly, this was no great force to academically manage what has retrospectively been called "the modern foundational period of contemporary international law". 187 In the aftermath of the First World War, the three most significant developments in international law in the first half of the 20 th century began to establish themselves: "the move to international organization in the political and other spheres; the development of permanent international courts and of a recognizable international judicial technique; and the attempt to control the use of force as an instrument of policy in international relations. 188 According to Crawford, the reason for the lack of a university international law tradition can be found in the nineteenth century, when, although "international law was a developed study in the English-speaking world" (…) "in England this had relatively little to do with the universities, and it was based on no new theoretical underpinnings or insights". Instead, whereas "international law was a developed system of practice for dealing with certain classes of relations beyond the state", (…) its "local focus was the Foreign Office and the embassies and lawyers' chambers in London rather than the universities". 189 Against this background, Lauterpacht's generational focus on the importance of judicial practice in international law is apparent in a series of his writings in the early 1930s. In in, and much general ignorance of, international law -public and private". Beckett noted that these "two factors, indifference and ignorance, operate in a vicious progression, one producing increased states of the other". 200 In The present interdisciplinary study has, however, made it sufficiently clear that an early version of N. Chamberlain´s "peace for our time" speech 210 , at the price of the sacrifice of Spain, was not the only -or even the main -factor behind British foreign policy-making regarding non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War. In other words, this study has shown is that what lay behind the British policy of appeasement of Germany and Italy was not only -to borrow from Lauterpacht´s laconic remark -"the general interest of peace". 211 In fact, to geostrategic concerns -including the protection of the Mediterranean "imperial route" through the Strait of Gibraltar -and British long-term economic interests 212 (40% of foreign investment in Spain was British in 1936), 213 one should add religious concerns and the anti-Bolshevism 214 of the British establishment elite. 215 The anti-communist element of British policy, which was fuelled by early reports to the Foreign Office from pro-Franco British diplomats in Spain, 216 remained an important factor in Britain's determination to prevent "France by hook or by crook from going "Bolshevik" under the influence of the Spanish Civil War". 217 Office at a time when -according to Crawford -international law provided "part of the language in which international debates were conducted, the conduct of politicians criticized, proposals for settlement or change put forward and rejected or agreed". 225 The non-intervention agreement marked the death knell of the system of collective security established by the League of Nations, and became the revolving door for Europe's entry into the Second World War. The real lasting legacy of the Spanish Civil War for the history of international law and civil wars is that it provides a cautionary tale about the role of international lawyers, who work as a two-way bridge between international policymaking and international law, 226 under the "gravitational or other effects" of those "black holes" 227 to which the repercussions of the "secret life of international law" on the "visible life of international law" 228 have been aptly compared.
by Lord Strabolgi, a Labour Peer, in an article critical of British policy in Spain which appeared in the Daily Herald, 10 August 1936. 225 Crawford, op.cit. 693. However, Crawford notes"But one must be careful not to draw too much from this in terms of the influence of particular scholars, or even of international lawyers in general To take an analogy, art critics may influence the development of painting in a variety of ways, but it would be misleading to write a history of art by reference to their work. For the most part the product of international law scholarship is a similarly secondary literature". James Crawford, also a former Whewell professor of International Law at the University of Cambridge followed the footsteps of A.D. McNair and H. Lauterpacht and became judge of the International Court of Justice in 2014. 226 Particularly acute in the international legal adviser, the duplicity of whom appears to be as old as the function. This duplicity is echoed by the very nick-name of "the first Legal Assistant appointed to the British Foreign office -in effect the post of Legal Adviser" in 1886, E. Davidson. This, according to J. Crawford, "was apparently known as "Quoad" Davidson for his habit of advising "quoad legal adviser" one thing, and "quoad Davidson" another Crawford op.cit., 687 227 
